THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.
185
F
134
THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR,
Government, and this was forthcoming at the psychological moment. On January 1, 1909, the Anglo-French negotiations for the Hankow-Canton Railway loan with the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung had reached a critical stage, the Viceroy objecting to the conditions stipu- lating for control over expenditure on con- struction. At this point the German Bank came forward in London with a definite claim to participate in the loan. The representative of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bauk-who was in favour of admitting them to participation-was thereupon authorized by the Foreign Office to consult the French Government and the French The French financial groups in the matter Government firmly declined to listen to the proposal. Their reply was communicated to the Germans "word for word, accompanied by an expression of reg et at its unfavourable charac ter" by the British Bank, a precceding to which the French Ambassador in London took strong exception. The British Foreign Office at this juncture had no policy other than that of its financial advisors, as subsequent events clearly proved.
The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, con- fronted with the French refusal, but assured of the sympathy of its British associates, an. nounced its intention of competing for the loan. Ten days later the Viceroy Chang, fully informed of the facts of the situation by Herr Cordes,
the political Director of the German Bank, definitely declined to concede the conditions which H.M's Minister at Peking had declared to be the irreducible minimum consistent with Great Britain's preferential rights. A week later, anticipating the coup de main, Sir John Jordan officially notified the Chinese Foreign Office that Great Britain would expect the Viceroy to recognize his obligations by not accepting any foreign offer for the loan without first informing him of its conditions and allowing a reasonable time for their considera- tion by British capitalists. This Note, which partook of the nature of an ultimatum, would no doubt have proved effective had the Chines Government had reason to believe that the British Government would stand to its guns Unfortunately, two days after its dispatcl. the representative of the Hongkong and Shan hai Bank was again authorized by the Foreign Office to approach the French group with a view to securing German participation in the loan. as the result of which mission an arrangement was concluded between the financiers at Paris on February 27 and in Berlin on March 1 for an Anglo-French German understanding in China for equal participation in all railway loan business."
The action of the British Foreign Office in sanctioning these negotiations by financiers in
IMPERIAL CHINESE TROOPS, UNDER THE MANCHUS.
atters of far-reaching political importance eeting the Entente could only be justified d-vis the French Government on grounds of pediency, and if it could be shown that the mission of the German Bank to participation the loan would promote the avowed policy of agland and France by collective insistence on the maintenance of the necessary control over pditure in other words, if Germany's ancial and diplomatic agents at Peking would puliate the promises they had made to the bina Government. Accordingly the preamble the new "Tripartite" agreement contained undertaking that all loans would be "accom- nied by suitable guarantees that the loan ads would be devoted to the object for which ey were ostensibly raised." The Deutsch- atiche Bank group in Berlin also agreed at in return for participation, they would thdraw their offer to the Chinese, and adhere, ong with the Anglo-French group, to the licy of insisting upon effective control over
a funds."
It was now time for the coup de main. bordingly the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, oring the scrap of paper which they had met in Berlin five days before, proceeded
ough their representative in Peking to sign joan agreement with the Viceroy Chang for eBankow-Canton Railway, in which the alated control over loan funds was not uded, The German Legation at Peking took active part in persuading the Chinese enuent that they might with impunity
commit themselves to this flagrant act of bad faith, and the result was welcomed by the German Press as a triumph of Gorman dip- lomacy. Downing Street, confronted by the fait accompli, sought comfort and justification for inaction in its persistent belief in the abiding virtue of cosmopolitan finance as a peare preserver. Having secured its ends, the German Bank offered to share the business with the British and French groups. After some face- saving negotiations, the offer was eventually accepted, with the rosuit that, under Gernien auspices, British and French capital was made available for the Chinese under conditions which were bound on the one hand to promote the prestige and commercial interests of Germany and on the other to accelerate the pace at which China was moving towards bankruptcy and disaster.
In extenuation of the part played in this lamentable surrender by the British, and eventually by the French financiers concerned, it is only fair to say that, failing a firm policy and a clear recognition of Germany's sums in Downing Street, failing anything like the German coordination of political and financial ends, they could never hope to compete success - fully with the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank at Peking. Behind that Bank were all the highly organized industrial Forces, all the utterly unscrupulous methods of Germany's Well- politik. Behind the British Bank, ontrusted by the British Government with the carrying out of important railway concessions (to obtain
LOCAL MILITIA, NORTH KIANGSU, Typical of the Chinese provincial recruits
284
1
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.